The exclusionary rule “is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard” the right of the people to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 14 (2007). Under the exclusionary rule, “the State is barred from introducing into evidence the fruits of an unlawful search or seizure by the police.” Id. The overarching purpose of the rule is “to deter the police from engaging in constitutional violations by denying the prosecution any profit from illicitly-obtained evidence.” Id. “Suppressing evidence sends the strongest possible message that constitutional misconduct will not be tolerated and therefore is intended to encourage fidelity of the law.” Id.

The exclusionary rule is applied to those circumstances where its remedial objectives can best be achieved. Williams, 192 N.J. at 15. For example, “the exclusionary rule [does] not apply when the connection between the unconstitutional police action and the evidence becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint from the unlawful conduct.” State v. Badessa, 185 N.J. 303, 311 (2005). “The critical determination is whether the authorities have obtained the evidence by means that are sufficiently independent to dissipate the taint of their illegal conduct.” Williams, 192 N.J. at 15. To determine whether there is sufficient attenuation to purge the unconstitutional taint from evidence offered by the State, three factors must be considered: “(1) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct.” Badessa, 185 N.J. at 312.

Below is a sample argument to demonstrate how the exclusionary rule operates:

Here, in both time and place, the challenged evidence that was seized from 10 Sycamore Road sprang directly from the unlawful search of Ms. Doe’s car. The unlawful search of Ms. Doe’s car resulted in the seizure of a plastic bag containing cocaine. The seizure of the bag of cocaine gave police probable cause to arrest Mr. Doe and Ms. Doe. Because the cocaine was obtained as the result of an unlawful search, there can be no question that Mr. Doe and Ms. Doe’s arrests were also unlawful. The incriminating statement that Mr. Doe gave following his unlawful arrest – that he kept a scale and an additional amount of cocaine at Ms. Doe’s house – was a direct fruit of that constitutional violation. Therefore, Mr. Doe’s statement is inadmissible.

The exclusion of Mr. Doe’s statement requires the suppression of the drugs and the drug paraphernalia that were seized from 10 Sycamore Road because the police would not have found this evidence if they had not questioned Mr. Doe. This is not the type of case envisioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court where the exclusionary rule has no application because the state learned of the evidence from an independent source nor is this a case in which the connection between the illegal conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Therefore, the drugs and drug paraphernalia that were seized from 10 Sycamore Road must be suppressed from evidence because they were obtained by the exploitation of Mr. Doe’s unlawful arrest and thus are the tainted fruits of the poisonous tree.

To argue that Ms. Doe’s signing of a “Consent to Search Form” for 10 Sycamore Road was sufficient to dissipate the taint of the officers’ illegal conduct falls woefully short. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the warrant requirement must not be regarded as a mere formality but as a formidable barrier to officers thrusting themselves into homes where persons have a right to “reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.” Id. at 14.